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SUMMARY
The recent sale of an artificial intelligence (AI)-generated portrait for $432,000 at
Christie’s art auction has raised questions about how credit and responsibility
should be allocated to individuals involved and how the anthropomorphic percep-
tion of the AI system contributed to the artwork’s success. Here, we identify nat-
ural heterogeneity in the extent to which different people perceive AI as anthro-
pomorphic. We find that differences in the perception of AI anthropomorphicity
are associated with different allocations of responsibility to the AI system and
credit to different stakeholders involved in art production. We then show that
perceptions of AI anthropomorphicity can be manipulated by changing the lan-
guage used to talk about AI—as a tool versus agent—with consequences for art-
ists and AI practitioners. Our findings shed light on what is at stake when we
anthropomorphize AI systems and offer an empirical lens to reason about how
to allocate credit and responsibility to human stakeholders.
INTRODUCTION
OnOctober 25, 2018, a portrait generated by a machine learning (ML) algorithm called a generative adver-
sarial network (or GAN) (Goodfellow et al., 2014) sold at Christie’s art auction for $432,500. As Christie’s
initial estimate for the piece was $10,000, its sale for over 40 times this expectation shocked the art world.
Marketed by Christie’s as ‘‘the first portrait generated by an algorithm to come up for auction,’’ the paint-
ing—entitled Edmond De Belamy (see Figure 1)—struck a chord about the nature of authorship and arti-
ficial intelligence (AI) (Cohn, 2018).
Yet the reality of the painting’s creation is not as clear as Christie’s purports. Even though AI played a role in
generating the artwork, Edmond de Belamy would never have been produced without the help of humans.
It was the Parisian art collective Obvious who selected, printed, marketed, and sold the image; but the hu-
man involvement does not stop there. The algorithm was trained on the paintings of Renaissance masters,
sourced from WikiArt. Ian Goodfellow invented the original GAN architecture, and Alec Radford, Luke
Metz, and Soumith Chintala innovated the DCGAN that actually generated the artwork. But perhaps the
most relevant here is the then-19-year-old artist and technologist, Robbie Barrat, who wrote code to pro-
duce Renaissance-style images with DCGAN (Learn more about his GitHub repo here: https://github.com/
robbiebarrat/art-DCGAN) and which was ostensibly lightly repurposed to produce Edmond de Belamy.
Barrat noted that Obvious ‘‘almost immediately started producing work identical to the outputs of the
pre-trained portrait and landscape networks’’ he had put online (Vincent, 2018). Neither Barrat nor the
ML researchers received any of the $432,500, which all went to Obvious.
Although the humans involved in the creation of Edmond de Belamy were essentially cut out of the art’s
creation narrative, the AI itself was often spoken about as having human-like characteristics. In a press
release, Obvious told reporters that ‘‘an artificial intelligence managed to create art,’’ which underpinned
their motto that ‘‘creativity isn’t only for humans.’’ When Christie’s was raising awareness about the im-
pending auction of Edmond De Belamy, they also employed anthropomorphic language to increase
hype for the work: ‘‘This portrait. is not the product of a human mind. It was created by an artificial intel-
ligence, an algorithm defined by that algebraic formula with its many parentheses’’ (Anonymous, 2018).
Another spokesperson went further saying, ‘‘We are offering a public platform to exhibit an artwork that
has entirely been realised by an algorithm,’’ (Hitti, 2018). The media ran with this narrative, creating a
discourse that emphasized the autonomy and agency of the algorithm (Table 1 contains further examples.).
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The story of Edmond de Belamy underscores two general obstacles for the accountability and governance
of AI systems, which are critical to understanding the complexity of assigning credit and responsibility in AI
art cases. The first obstacle is knowing what the set of possibly relevant human stakeholders are and how
they are relatively positioned within an AI system. Indeed, AI is a diffuse term that corresponds to a web of
human actors and computational processes interacting in complex ways (Seaver, 2017). This complexity
may lead to situations wherein individual responsibility and accountability is obfuscated due to a lack of
clear understanding of who the relevant actors are and how they interact. Such lack of understanding
can manifest as the Moral Crumple Zone, whereby disproportional outrage is channeled toward a periph-
eral person of an AI system simply because the person is closest to the transgression (think about an upset
customer yelling at the employee at the flight kiosk when their flight is canceled, despite the fact that the
employee had nothing to do with the cancellation itself) (Elish, 2019). Our intuitive moral understanding of
actors and transgressions may be at odds with the inherent complexity of AI systems.
Previous studies of the social impact of AI have considered a wide range of possible human stakeholders. In
the context of autonomous vehicles (AVs), Waytz et al. consider the human passenger, the car itself, the
people who designed the car, and the company that developed the car (Waytz et al., 2014), whereas
Awad and Levine et al. consider the human passenger, the car itself, the company who created it, and
the programmer who implemented the car’s software (Awad et al., 2018). In the context of AI art, Eshra-
ghian distinguishes between the programmer, the trainer, and the user (Eshraghian, 2020), whereasMcCor-
mack et al. similarly distinguish between the creators of the software, curators of datasets, and those who
train the algorithm and modify parameters (McCormack et al., 2019).
A second obstacle is the phenomenon of anthropomorphizing AI systems. With the recent boom of supra-
human performance on such tasks as Atari games (Mnih et al., 2015), Go (Silver et al., 2016), and lung cancer
detection (Ardila et al., 2019), we have seen a proliferation of the anthropomorphization of AI in the media
Figure 1. Image of the Painting Edmond de Belamy, which Sold for $432,500 at Christie’s Art Auction
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(Proudfoot, 2011; Watson, 2019; Salles et al., 2020). This has been exacerbated by the ML literature itself
(Lipton and Steinhardt, 2018), wheremanyML tasks and techniques are described using the same language
we would use for a human doing the task—sreading comprehension (Hermann et al., 2015), music compo-
sition (Mozer, 1994), curiosity (Schmidhuber, 1991), fear (Lipton et al., 2016), ‘‘thought’’ vectors (Kiros et al.,
2015), and ‘‘consciousness’’ priors (Bengio, 2017).
But what is at stake when we anthropomorphize AI? Recent work reveals how anthropomorphization can
affect trust. Through a series of experiments involving an unavoidable crash in a driving simulator with
cars of varying complexity (i.e., a normal car versus a self-driving car versus an anthropomorphized self-
driving car with a human voice and name), Waytz et al. show that increases in the anthropomophization
of a car predicts trust in the car (Waytz et al., 2014). Although they mostly focused on the psychological
construct of trust, they also found that anthropomorphization affects attributions of responsibility and pun-
ishment for the car’s mistakes, which is consistent with the established relationship between the agency
and perceived responsibility (Epley et al., 2007; Waytz et al., 2014). This builds on a growing body of
work that our ‘‘mind perception’’ (which manifests as inferences of intentions, beliefs, and values) meaning-
fully varies across individuals and shapes our moral judgments (Epley et al., 2007; Gray et al., 2007, 2012;
Waytz et al., 2010).
There is also the concern that anthropomorphizing AI systems can ‘‘undermine our ability to hold powerful
individuals and groups accountable for their technologically-mediated actions’’ (Watson, 2019). When an
AI system causes a moral transgression, it may be the case that the programmer or systems architect can
eschew personal responsibility by blaming the ‘‘unexpected behavior’’ of the system, downplaying their
own involvement. Along these lines in the context of AVs, Gill found that participants thought harming a
pedestrian was more permissible for an AV when compared with a human in a regular car and that the attri-
bution of responsibility to the AV drove the shift in moral judgment (Gill, 2020).
Ultimately, as AI systems become further integrated into human decision-making, it is likely that they will be
increasingly anthropomorphized. Thus, understanding the psychological mechanics of this ‘‘absorption of
responsibility’’ by the AI is important for the accountability and governance of AI systems. In particular, in
line with Watson, one might expect that increased anthropomorphicity of an AI system may diminish the
perceived responsibility of all human actors involved (Watson, 2019). Yet ultimately this is an empirical
question subject to inquiry.
Quote Source
This portrait. is not the product of a human mind. It was created by an artificial
intelligence, an algorithm defined by that algebraic formula with its many
parentheses
Christie’s (Anonymous, 2018)
AI has already been incorporated as a tool by contemporary artists and as this
technology further develops, we are excited to participate in these continued
conversations. To best engage in the dialogue, we are offering a public platform to
exhibit an artwork that has entirely been realised by an algorithm,
Christie’s (Hitti, 2018)
Christie’s, the auction house that has sold paintings by picasso and monet at record
prices, was poised on Tuesday to set another milestone with the first-ever auction of
art created by artificial intelligence.
Reuters (Goldberg, 2018)
The painting, titled ‘‘the portrait of edmond belamy,’’ was completed by artificial
intelligence managed by a Paris-based collective called Obvious, Christie’s said.
USA Today (Molina, 2018)
Whether art or not, the signature of the ‘artist’ at the bottom of the painting gives
away its origin as a product of machine learning rather than human hand.
PC Mag (Smith, 2018)
Once the software ‘‘understood the rules of portraiture’’ using a new algorithm
developed by Google researcher Ian Goodfellow, it then generated a series of new
images by itself, Fautrel said.
NDTV (France-Presse, 2018)
Table 1. Media Snippets from the Edmond de Belamy Case
Agentic language is bolded.
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In this article, we use the case of Edmond de Belamy to explore these questions in the context of AI art: not
only was there ambiguity about the humans involved in the creation process but also rampant anthropor-
morphizaton of the process itself.
To those ends, we focus on two main research questions:
1. How do people think credit and responsibility should be allocated to various actors in the production
of AI art?
2. How do these intuitions vary based on people’s perceptions of the anthropomorphicity of the AI sys-
tem?
These research questions are closely related to, but distinct from, the broader philosophical questions
related to AI art, such as ‘‘Can computers create art?’’ Hertzmann traces the histories of several art automa-
tion technologies (such as the camera and animation) to argue that generative AI technologies are yet
another artistic tool, with their own distinct affordances (Hertzmann, 2018). As such, he contends that art
is necessarily authored by social agents, and thus AI algorithms (as understood today) cannot be credited
with authorship of art. McCormack et al. build on these ideas in the context of the Edmond de Belamy phe-
nomenon (McCormack et al., 2019). They conclude that ‘‘The creator of the software and person who
trained and modified parameters to produce the work can both be considered authors,’’ but that ‘‘AI sys-
tems are not broadly accepted as authors by artistic or general public communities.’’
These scholars make convincing arguments for why AI systems ought not be credited with authorship.
Our investigation concerns a different question, namely, how does the public assign credit to an AI
involved in making art? In particular, we use a series of vignette studies to directly explore the relation-
ship between anthropomorphicity of the AI and the levels of responsibility assigned to various actors in
an AI system. By focusing on peoples’ intuitions in these vignettes, we consider credit and responsibility
in the broad sense of public perception, rather than in the legal or prescriptive sense (Colton, 2008;
Eshraghian, 2020).
The Terminology of AI Art
Computer-generated artwork has a long and diverse history and involves a wide range of AI tools and AI-
human interaction paradigms. Some use interactive evolutionary algorithms to crowd-source the creation
and curation of artifacts (Draves, 2005; Epstein et al., 2020; Secretan et al., 2011; Sims, 1991), whereas others
have created platforms for artists and practitioners to use AI models, such as RunwayML, GANPaint (Bau
et al., 2018), and DeepAngel (Groh et al., 2019). In addition to GANs, many other visual generative algo-
rithms have been explored, such as neural style transfer (Gatys et al., 2016), Computational Aesthetics (Ma-
chado et al., 2008), Fractal Flame (Draves, 2005; Draves and Reckase, 2003), deep learning-powered adver-
sarial evolution (Blair, 2019), and hybrid methods (Colton, 2008, 2012). Here, following the case study of
Edmond de Belamy, we trace a particular type of AI art, where the system is presented with human artwork
and attempts to mimic the style of the human artists. This process involves both a specific AI technology




In Study 1, participants read a stylized vignette that described the process by which AI artwork is created.
They were asked to allocate responsibility and monetary credit to the agents involved in the creation of the
AI art. Then, they were asked four questions designed to elicit their perception of the AI’s anthropomor-
phicity (Waytz et al., 2014), which were combined into an aggregate score (for more information on the
vignette-dependent variables and anthropomorphicity measure, see Supplementary Information). We hy-
pothesized that participants who anthropomorphize the AI system to a greater extent will allocate more
responsibility to the AI system itself. In addition, subjects were randomly assigned to one of two conditions.
In one condition, the art is found to violate copyright law and a fine is levied against it (negative outcome).
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For both the positive and negative valence conditions, we see substantial variation in AI anthropomorphic-
ity (see the left pane of Figure 2). This indicates that different participants had markedly different baseline
perceptions of AI.
We now turn to assessing the impact of these differences in perception on attribution of responsibility.
Following our pre-registered analysis plan, we collapse across valence conditions and see that participants
who anthropomorphize the AI more also assign more responsibility to it: participants who rated the system
more than the median anthropomorphicity score assigned significantly more responsibility (4.75) to the AI
than the participants who rated the system less than the median anthropomorphicity (4.75 versus 3.03,
respectively, t = 5.1159, df = 113.67, p < 0.001, preregistered).
In a follow-up post hoc analysis, we enter the data into a regression model to see whether anthropomor-
phicity (using the continuous measure) and valence interact. We find a significant main effect of anthropo-
morphicity (t = 4.634, p < 0.0001) as well as valence (t = 4.816, p < 0.0001), and we also find a significant
positive interaction between them (t = 2.295, p = 0.0234). Decomposing this interactions shows that
whereas there is at least a marginally significant positive relationship between anthropomorphicity and
AI responsibility in both valence conditions, the relationship is significantly stronger in the negative valence
condition (r = 0.4994, t = 4.237, p < 0.0001) relative to the positive valence condition (r = 0.2111, t = 1.794,
p = 0.0771).
These findings suggest that the extent to which people perceive the AI system as an agent is correlated
with the extent to which they allocate responsibility to it, extending results from prior work on the AVs
(Waytz et al., 2010) to the context of art. But how does this impact the responsibility of the other actors
involved in the production of AI art? Critically, the Edmond de Belamy case suggests that the mind percep-
tion of the AI system impacts how people assign responsibility not only to the system itself but also to prox-
imal humans (such as Obvious or Robbie Barrat).
Therefore, in addition to looking at the attributions of responsibility to the AI system itself, we also
consider various involved human actors, such as the artist (i.e., the person taking the inputs and
the learning algorithms and producing a trained algorithm), the curator (i.e., the person who selects
the final artwork and brings it to auction), the technologist (i.e., the person who creates the learning
algorithm), and the crowd (i.e., the people whose labor is responsible for creating the inputs to the
algorithm), as shown in Figure 3. We find that participants who anthropomorphized the AI more
than the median assign more responsibility to the crowd and technologist, when compared with those
who anthropomorphized the AI less than the median (t = 5.3214, p < 0.0001 and t = 3.5603, p =
0.00026 for crowd and technologist, respectively). We also observed a marginal increase in responsi-
bility assigned to the curator (t = 1.6227, p = 0.05374) and no change in responsibility assigned to the
Figure 2. Anthropomorphicity and Repsonsibility by Valence
Left: kernel density plot of anthropomorphicity measure for positive valence (art received positive reception and is sold at
a prestigious auction house, in green) and negative valence (the art is found to violate copyright law and a fine is levied
against it, in red) outcomes. Brown is overlap between the two. Right: Responsibility allocated to the AI system for users
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artist (t = 1.0138, p = 0.1564). As a result, participants who anthropomorphized the AI more assigned
less proportional credit to the artist (as they assigned more responsibility to other roles, and not any
more responsibility to the artist).
Study 2
In Study 2, we test whether the correlational relationships observed in Study 1 are in fact causal. We do so
by experimentally manipulating the perceived anthropomorphicity of the AI, and considering the impact of
that manipulation on perception of the humans involved. As in Study 1, participants read a vignette that
described the process of AI art creation. In the Tool Condition, the AI was described as a tool used by a
human artist. In the Agent Condition, the AI was described as an agentic and anthropomorphized AI artist
(see Supplementary Information for vigenettes). By directly manipulating the anthropormorphicity of the AI
system (conceptually following the approach of Malle et al. (2016) from the field of Human Robot Interac-
tion), we can causally assess the impact of anthropomorphization.
As anticipated, we find a significant difference in perceived anthropomorphicity of the AI agent by condi-
tion, as shown in Figure 4 (t = 2.75, df = 317.99, p = 0.003). This manipulation check indicates that our
treatments were successful in affecting participants’ conceptualizations of the AI’s anthropomorphicity.
Consistent with the correlational results in Study 1, we find that when the AI system is described as an
agent, participants ascribe more responsibility it, compared with when the AI system is described as a
non-agent (t = 2.5928, df = 311.69, p = 0.0004, pre-registered; Figure 5). We also find that participants
ascribe less responsibility to the artist who used the AI system in the agentic condition, when compared
with when the AI system is described as a non-agent (t = 3.375, df = 293.05, p = 0.0004). In contrast,
participants ascribe more responsibility to the technologist who used the AI system in the agentic con-
dition, when compared with when the AI system is described as a non-agent (t = 3.158, df = 316.35, p =
0.0008).
We find these results are robust to control for valence. For responsibility to the AI, we find a main effect for
both the agent treatment (p = 0.00746) and valence (p < 0.0001). For responsibility to the technologist, we
find a main effect for both the agent treatment (p = 0.00542) and valence (p < 0.0001). For responsibility to
the artist, we find amain effect for both the agent treatment (p = 0.02728) and valence (p = 0.00581). In none
of these cases did we find an interaction effect between valence and agent (p = 0.3422 for AI, p = 0.64415
for artist, and p = 0.53880 for technologist).
For responsibility to the crowd, we find a marginal effect for the agent treatment (p = 0.0783), a significant
effect for valence (p < 0.0001), and a marginal interaction effect (p = 0.0627). For responsibility to the
curator, we find no effect for the agent treatment (p = 0.261), a marginal effect for valence (p = 0.101),
and a marginal interaction effect (p = 0.059).
Subjects were also asked to assign credit (in the form of monetary awards or fines) to each of the humans in
the system. Results mirror those of the responsibility judgments, although there is more variance in the dol-
lar allocation (Figure 6). When the AI system is described as an agent, participants ascribe less fine/award to
the artist (t = 5.37, df = 317.99, p value = <0.0001, pre-registered), and more fine/award to the
Figure 3. Allocation of Responsibility to Each of the Actors Involved in the Creation of AI-Generated Art,
Collapsed Across Valence
The roles of crowd, technologist, artist, curator and ELIZA are described in Table S1. Means with 95% confidence intervals.
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technologist who developed the AI system, when compared with when the AI is described as a non-agent
(t =4.38, df = 311.43, p value = <0.0001). Conversely, we found no significant difference across conditions
in the fine/award ascribed to the crowd (p = 0.273), but a marginally significant difference across conditions
in the fine/award ascribed to the curator (p = 0.07654). We also find no interactions between condition and
valence in regression models for any of the four actors (p > 0.1381 for all).
Finally, we note that across conditions and for both the allocation of responsibility and credit, participants
thought the artist was the most accountable, followed by the curator, then the technologist, and finally the
crowd. This suggests a robust baseline ordering of the relative importance of the actors for the context of
AI-generated art.
DISCUSSION
No AI acts alone, completely divorced from the influence of humans. Even the artwork Edmond de Belamy,
which was claimed to be ‘‘entirely. realised by an algorithm,’’ was the result of the creativity, hard work,
and decisions of numerous human contributors. When an AI system achieves something great or causes a
serious problem, how is responsibility attributed to the humans surrounding it? We explored this question
in the domain of AI-generated art. We showed that there is natural heterogeneity in the extent to which
individuals perceive AI used to generate art. In addition, perceived anthropomorphicity can be actively
manipulated depending on how the AI is described. We also showed that different degrees of anthropo-
morphicity impact the responsibility attributed to surrounding humans in different ways. Instead of
reducing perceived responsibility of all human actors, we instead find that anthropomorphizing the AI sys-
tem serves to increase responsibility to some actors and decrease responsibility to others. In particular,
anthropomorphizing the AI system mitigates the responsibility to the artist, while bolstering the responsi-
bility of the technologist. Critically, this suggests that the responsibility that will be allocated to individuals
in the creation of AI art will be dependent on the choice of language and framing used to discuss it. It is
important for artists, computer scientists, and the media at large to be aware of the power of their words,
and for the public to be discerning in the narratives they consume.
Our results shed light on the responsibility conundrum of the Edmond de Belamy case. People allocated
the most credit and responsibility to the artist, then the curator, then the technologist, and finally the
crowd. These results suggest that although this hierarchy is robust, even the crowd is deemed worthy of
a non-trivial amount of responsibility and credit. It seems that our participants think Robbie Barrat, the pro-
grammer who created the Github repository that Obvious ostensibly pulled from to create Edmond de Bel-
amy, should be given credit for his contribution.
In Study 2, the two conditions we used (Tool and Agent) captured two extremes concerning how AI systems are
discussed in the media (see Table 1). The Tool Condition used non-agentic language and described the AI as
being manipulated by a human, whereas the Agent Condition used anthropomorphic language and described
Figure 4. Anthropomorphicity (e.g., First Principal
Component of the Principal-Component Analysis)
for the Condition Describing the AI as a Tool and as
an Agent, Respectively
Means with 95% confidence intervals.
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the AI as taking independent actions. Our vignettes were designed tomirror two generalmodes of discussing AI
in the media ecosystem: agentic/anthropomorphized or tool-like/non-anthropomorphized. Naturally, if an AI is
described as having agent-like properties (e.g., making decisions) anthropomorphic language (e.g., that it has
desires) will often be used to describe it. Future work should attempt to isolate these variables. Are our results
due to the agent-like behavior of the AI, the anthropomorphic language, or both?
Finally, it is important to note that our findings are not straightforwardly prescriptive. We do not
intend to make claims about the extent to which various parties should be held accountable in the
contexts we study. Rather, we are reporting what participants think about how accountability should
be distributed. Although we do not think that public opinion about accountability should directly
translate into policy, public perceptions can be important for policy makers, for instance, to predict
public reaction to a policy or to determine how to open public debate on a controversial topic (Rah-
wan et al., 2019).
Limitations of the Study
There are several potential limitations to this work. First, as discussed in the discussion, there is the poten-
tial confound in Study 2 of agent-like behavior and anthropomorphic language. Future work might attempt
to isolate these variables. Second, our studies were run on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. Future work might
look at how these effects generalize to other populations. Third, as discussed in the Introduction, our study
focuses on a particular method of producing AI-generated artwork. Future work might test the generaliz-
ability of our results to other forms of AI-generated art.
Resource Availability
Lead Contact
Further information and requests for resources and reagents should be directed to and will be fulfilled by
the Lead Contact, Ziv Epstein (zive@mit.edu).
Materials Availability
This study did not generate new unique reagents.
Data and Code Availability
The datasets and code generated during this study are available at https://github.com/zivepstein/ai-art-
credit.
METHODS
All methods can be found in the accompanying Transparent Methods supplemental file.
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
Supplemental Information can be found online at https://doi.org/10.1016/j.isci.2020.101515.
Figure 5. Allocation of Responsibility to Each of the Actors Involved in the Creation of AI-Generated Art
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1. Transparent Methods
We preregistered our primary hypotheses, primary analyses and sample
size, which are available at https://aspredicted.org/blind.php?x=us2bb8
for Study 1 and https://aspredicted.org/blind.php?x=ek62qd for Study 2.
All participants were recruited using Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. These studies
were approved by the MIT COUHES committee.
1.1. Study 1
1.1.1. Participants
Our target sample was 200. In total, 227 participants completed some por-
tion of the study. We had complete data for 156 participants (71 participants
dropped out). Participants were removed (N=28) if they failed any of our at-
tention checks, which included comprehension questions about the vignette, and
these exclusions were pre-registered. The final sample (N=127, mean age = 35.5
years) included 72 male and 53 female participants (2 did not indicate their sex).
1.1.2. Materials
We used the vignette described in Table S1.
1.1.3. Procedure
After reading the vignette allocated to them by their condition, participants
were asked to rate of the responsibility of each of the 5 actors from the vignette
(e.g. the people from crowdimage.net, the technologist, the artist, the curator
and the AI itself) on a 7-point likert scale ranging from 1 (not responsible at all)
to 7 (extremely responsible). They were also asked to distribute the money(the
award in the positive valence condition and the fine in the negative valence
condition) to the 4 human actors (we omitted the AI from this measure since
an AI cannot receive money).
Finally, each participant was asked four questions derived from the work
of Waytz and colleagues (Waytz et al., 2014) designed to elicit their percep-
tion of the AI’s anthropomorphicity. These questions were: Q1: “How smart
is ELIZA?”, Q2: “When creating the artwork, to what extent did ELIZA feel
what was happening around it?”, Q3: “To what extent did ELIZA anticipate
the creation of the artwork?” and Q4: “To what extent did ELIZA plan the art-
work?”. Participants responded to these 4 questions on a 7-point scale ranging
from 1 (not at all) to 7 (extremely).
We then used principal component analysis to collapse the 4 anthropomor-
phicity questions into a single measure A where
A = 0.633 ∗Q1 + 0.372 ∗Q2 + 0.480 ∗Q3 + 0.479 ∗Q4
(where this first principle component explains 90.2% of the total variance).
1
Thousands of people from all over the world upload images to
crowdimage.net, a image-hosting website. These people know that
artists will look at and use their images to make art.
Timmy is a technologist who creates an image manipulation
software for people to use to make art. The software is called
ELIZA.
Alice is an artist who collaborates with ELIZA, a creative AI
algorithm that creates particular kinds of images. ELIZA takes an
existing image of a scene from the news (such as a beach or a forest)
and adds a ghost to it. This is how ELIZA decides to make the ghost:
It goes to crowdimage.net and takes at all the images of people that
have been uploaded to the platform. Then, it creates a composite of
the people. This makes a ghost-like figure, which ELIZA then puts
into the scene.
Casey is a curator who is ELIZA’s collaborator. Casey goes
through many of the images that ELIZA created and selects the
following artwork because Casey really likes it. Casey then brings it
to an art auction, where it ends up being sold.
Negative valence outcome
The artwork sold at the art auction
has come under scrutiny because it was
shown to violate copyright law. The
court ruled that the sale of the art must
be nullified, meaning that the money
will be returned to the buyer. In addi-
tion, the courts have issued a $400,000
fine as a penalty for the copyright vio-
lation.
Positive valence outcome
The artwork shown before sold for
$400,000 at the prestigious auction
house. This was the largest dollar
amount paid for a artwork of this kind
ever, and made lots of headlines.




Our target sample was 400. In total, 596 participants completed some por-
tion of the study. We had complete data for 421 participants (175 participants
dropped out). Participants were removed (N=81) if they failed any of our atten-
tion checks, which included comprehension questions about the vignette. The
final sample (N=320, mean age = 39.3 years) included 172 male and 146 female
participants (2 did not indicate their sex).
1.2.2. Materials
We used the vignette described in Table S2.
1.2.3. Procedure
Similar to Study 1, after reading the randomly assigned vignette, partici-
pants were asked to rate the responsibility of each of the 5 actors on a 7-point
scale, to distribute the money to the 4 human actors, and to answer the anthro-
pomoprhicity battery.
We then used principal component analysis to collapse these 4 measures into
a single measure of anthropomorphicity A where
A = 0.616 ∗Q1 + 0.389 ∗Q2 + 0.495 ∗Q3 + 0.472 ∗Q4
(where this first principle component explains 90.23% of the total variance).
References
Waytz, A., Heafner, J., Epley, N., 2014. The mind in the machine: Anthropo-
morphism increases trust in an autonomous vehicle. Journal of Experimental
Social Psychology 52, 113–117.
3
Table S2: Vignettes used for Study 2. Related to Figures 4, 5, and 6.
AI as Tool Condition
Thousands of people from all
over the world upload images to
crowdimage.net, a image-hosting web-
site. These people know that artists
will look at and use their images to
make art.
Timmy is a technologist who cre-
ates an image manipulation software
for people to use to make art. The
software is called ImageBrush.
The software is a tool that humans use
to make art. The artist plans and en-
visions the artwork, and the software
executes simple commands based on
what the artist tells it to do.
Alice is an artist who uses Image-
Brush to create particular kinds of im-
ages. Alice takes an existing image of
a scene from the news (such as a beach
or a forest) and adds a ghost to it us-
ing ImageBrush. This is how Alice de-
cides to make the ghost: she goes to
crowdimage.net and takes at all the im-
ages of people that have been uploaded
to the platform. Then, She creates a
composite of the people using Image-
Brush. This makes a ghost-like figure,
which Alice then puts into the scene.
Casey is a curator who is Alice’s col-
laborator. Casey goes through many
of the images that Alice created and
selects the following artwork because
Casey really likes it. Casey then brings
it to an art auction, where it ends up
being sold.
AI as Agent Condition
Thousands of people from all
over the world upload images to
crowdimage.net, a image-hosting web-
site. These people know that artists
will look at and use their images to
make art.
Timmy is a technologist who
creates an image manipulation soft-
ware for people to use to make art.
The software is called SARA.
SARA is a deep neural network that
creatively plans and envisions new
artworks, with minor help from an
artist collaborator.
Alice is an artist who collaborates
with SARA to create particular kinds
of images. SARA takes an existing im-
age of a scene from the news (such as
a beach or a forest) and adds a ghost
to it. This is how SARA decides to
make the ghost: it goes to crowdim-
age.net and takes at all the images of
people that have been uploaded to the
platform. Then, it creates a composite
of the people. This makes a ghost-like
figure, which SARA then puts into the
scene.
Casey is a curator who is SARA’s
collaborator. Casey goes through
many of the images that SARA created
and selects the following artwork be-
cause Casey really likes it. Casey then
brings it to an art auction, where it
ends up being sold.
Negative valence outcome
The artwork sold at the art auction
has come under scrutiny because it was
shown to violate copyright law. The
court ruled that the sale of the art must
be nullified, meaning that the money
will be returned to the buyer. In addi-
tion, the courts have issued a $400,000
fine as a penalty for the copyright vio-
lation.
Positive valence outcome
The artwork shown before sold for
$400,000 at the prestigious auction
house. This was the largest dollar
amount paid for a artwork of this kind
ever, and made lots of headlines.
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